There has been a push towards democracy, in particular within the West, for nearly a century. Following World War II the push gained even greater momentum in non-Soviet Bloc states. But states were also faced with an increasingly polarized world; whether to side with the U.S. and its western allies, or the USSR and states within its sphere of influence. Both Kazakhstan and Venezuela provide interesting case studies on how the influence of both sides helped to shape the current political climate in both states. What’s more, however, each state has unique characteristics that have helped to shape their current respective political and social climates. Additionally, these unique characteristics—institutions, degree of civil society, history, and current leadership—also help to illuminate why Democracy has failed to truly take hold in both Kazakhstan and Venezuela.
Venezuela
Like many states throughout Latin America, Venezuela claims to be a democratic state. As with other similar states, however, whether or not Venezuela can truly be considered a democracy is up for debate. On the one hand, President Hugo Chavez, the charismatic but somewhat quixotical ruler, continues to inflate his own power and centralize the government. On the other hand, Chavez was recently reelected and has stated he would not accept a lifetime appointment to the office. There have been arguments put forth that Venezuelan democracy, like other Latin American democracies, cannot be viewed under the same criteria as Western democracies, especially, the American model.[i] Instead, many contend that Venezuela is a Christian Democracy. Christian Democracies, as many states are referred to in Latin America, are said to have different socio-economic factors and traditions that impact its society and subsequent governance of said society, in particular a religious tradition that permeates society to its core. Rather than a Lockean democracy, or even more of a Rosseauean democracy, democracy in Venezuela stems more from the ideas of St. Thomas Acquinesce. If a catholic tradition defines Venezuelan democracy, then why do other catholic majority states have functioning representative that more closely represent the western tradition? There are several other important factors that must be discussed to illustrate what has actually contributed to and also hindered democracy in Venezuela. Asserting that President Chavez is putting into action the public will and is therefore in line with democracy may not be true.[ii] Venezuela is currently becoming less democratic, and, what’s more, may slip back into a cycle of social unrest and cries for reform. Venezuela, what’s more, Hugo Chavez, will need to move away from its current form of illiberal democracy and adopt policies that will move it towards a functioning liberal democracy.
In 1958 Venezuelan dictator Perez Jimenez was ousted from power and the direction of the state was changed dramatically.[iii] It should be noted, however, that the governments of Lopez Contreras and Medina Angarita both extended democratic liberties between 1936 and 1945.[iv] “The unbroken thread of Venezuelan democracy dates from January 1, 1959, when Romulo Betancourt took the oath as president, less than a month after his victory in the national elections of December 5. This fledging political regime, known as Punto Fijo democracy, withstood challenges over four decades from neighboring dictators, leftist guerrillas, disgruntled military officers, and urban rioters.”[v] This was a truly unprecedented occurrence; in its 130 year history Venezuela lacked any experience with democracy. Under the Punto Fijo regime Venezuela would now have a representative democracy. The fledgling democracy would even draw praise. Even President John F. Kennedy praised the state for its ability to avoid authoritarianism and communism as other Latin American states were succumbing to such forces.[vi] Furthermore, throughout the 1960s Venezuela remained the prime example for how democracy could work in the region. In the following decade, however, what would come to be known as decentralization would overtake the Venezuelan political landscape. The fractious party system of the 1960s would give way to the emergence of a two-party system. The general realignment of parties occurred seemingly through negotiation, shared values, and political pragmatism. Voter turnout and, again, support for the two party system remained high. “Between 1973 and 1988, the share of presidential and congressional vote between the two parties remained above 70 per cent…Consistently high levels of voter participation surpassed the turnout in mature democratic systems. Abstention in national elections prior to 1978 remained below 10 per cent.”[vii] Polling revealed that Venezuelan voters, by and large, rejected extremism from either end. These bawdy participation rates would however fail to remain at high level, rather, they would continually drop.
Abundant fossil fuel resources, mainly oil and gas, brought Venezuela into the international fold during the 20th century. The elite class, now mainly at the helm of oil and gas ventures, became increasingly frustrated with authoritarian regimes and sought reforms. During the era of the Punto Fijo regime Accion Democratica (AP) and Comite de Organizicion Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI) would become the two dominant political parties. But, as in many fledgling democracies, societal elites controlled both parties, thusly controlling the government. Punto Fijo elites, as a whole, did seek reforms, but there were two major impediments to effectual reform.
First, fearing the spread of radical influence domestically, the military could not focus mainly on external threats, as was promised, rather it would continue to focus on domestic stability and control. Venezuela was subject to both internal and external pressures that would require the military to support democracy; supported by Fidel Castro and the Kremlin, leftist guerillas exercised an insurgency bent on dislodging the democratic regime. Contrarily, the US and its western power brokers supported the exceptional democracy in Venezuela and sought to nurture reforms and stability.[viii] The support of the military was deemed of vital importance. President Betancourt’s budgets always favored the military. Also, in 1961 party leaders put forth that defending the constitution was another duty of the military. “This defense of the 1961 constitution created a bond between the military and governing civilians. It also increased contact between Venezuela’s armed forces and the U.S. military at a time when the U.S. government was touting procedural democracy as the only viable alternative to communism in Latin America. Venezuela’s once hostile military officer corps guardedly supportive of democracy.”[ix]
Second, political influence continued to hinge on access to oil wealth. The US not only sought another democratic ally in the hemisphere, but also another dependable source for fossil fuels. It would not be hard to argue that the reforms sought after the coup that ousted Jimenez was not influenced by the unpopularity of US presence in Venezuelan oilfields. The Punto Fijo regime sought greater national control of Venezuela’s oil resource. It can hardly be viewed as mere coincidence that 1973 was a keystone year. Starting in 1973, oil prices began a dramatic ascension. But the dispersion of wealth, both actual and perceived, was largely disproportionate.
The poor, concentrated mainly in urban areas, began to view government tax collection with disdain as revenues generated from oil exports far exceeded the government budget. Also, in 1973 Venezuela enjoyed windfall profits, most of which went to the elites in the private sector. But in 1982, the oil market seemingly bottomed out, which while hitting the private sector quite hard, as far as the populace was concerned, hit the public sector with the grandest of veracity. While many of the private ventures, who had enjoyed the highest levels profits, were declaring bankruptcy, public ventures, who had enjoyed far less of the profits, were left to pay the lion’s share of the debt. The Punto Fijo regime had promised to change the political climate of corruption perpetrated by Perez Jimenez, but were tragically unable to do so. “Punto Fijo created incentives for clientelistic practices and corrupt behaviour. With appointment based on patronage, the military, judiciary and bureaucracy were politicized and locked into corrupt practices. This created powerful vested interests in the foundational agreements of the Punto Fijo regime.”[x] Rampant corruption would overtake Venezuela. “Transparency International found Venezuela to be the 46th most corrupt country in a table of 52. With the introduction of further countries to the survey in 1999, Venezuela was placed at number 75 out of the 99 countries examined and the second most corrupt country in Latin America.”[xi] The years between the Punto Fijo regime and the ascension of the current Bolivarian regime under President Hugo Chavez was marked with a dramatic increase in GDP, as well as a growth and alienation of urban poor. Oil wealth will remain a key component of Venezuelan national identity. “Throughout the twentieth, and into the twenty-first century, oil remained inseparable from the evolution of Venezuelan state building and was linked to the rise of nationalism. Without a critical assessment of the historical context of oil policy it is difficult to grasp the political divide in present-day Venezuela.”[xii]
The AP, which had enjoyed prominence in the two-party system, began to lose its once established position. Concurrently, the COPEI could not hold sustain its political clout. Consejo Nacional Electoral (CSE) began to become one of the most trusted institutions in Venezuela. But, just like the AP and COPEI, the CSE could not avoid being marred by corruption and public distrust during the 1970s and 1980s. Of these parties however, the AP would be the only to remain thoroughly relevant into the 1990s. While decentralization was practiced during the Punto Fijo regime, it has accelerated in subsequent years.
Enter Hugo Chavez. A charismatic military veteran, politician, and fervent antineoliberal,[xiii] Chavez was among a growing number of Venezuelans fed up with grantees being paid to foreign investors. Hugo Chavez, who had been a key figure in two attempted military coups in the early 1990s, won the presidential election in 1998. “Chavez promised to implement sweeping political reforms and expand political participation. His leadership not only contributed to the end of the domination of the AD and COPEI but also became a turning point in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.”[xiv] After gaining control of the county in 1999, Chavez, who had championed social reforms, starkly turned away from social reform and Chavez instead focused on economic growth. “On a balance, the attempts of the Chavez administration to remedy this situation during the period 1999-2003 were relatively disappointing for its supporters and the promised social reforms were still not completely under way. Nevertheless, there were clear indications of its priorities. The progressive reduction of social expenditure was reversed.”[xv] But Chavez remained a preferable alternative to the majority of his opposition, the majority of them backed by the U.S. This appeared to most Venezuelans as yet another example of the U.S. only caring about its interests, rather than actual democracy.
Another experience that undoubtedly shaped the Chavez regime was came about after a successful military coup in 2002. Chavez was briefly deposed. “The broad expansion of the military’s participation in government policy making and implementation, combined with the elimination of institutions of containment and oversight, indicates that Venezuela’s institutions of civilian control have unraveled. As the events of April 11, 2002, demonstrate, elected officials no longer have the ability to defend the regime against military conspiracies or carry out their constitutional duty of ensuring that the activities of the defense bureaucracy match the policies of the civilian government. The return of Chavez to power after being deposed was a product of the political ineptness of the interim Cardona administration rather than any institutions. In the wake of this experience, Chavez did not choose to restore institutionalized control but has resorted to ever more politicized and personalized mechanisms for controlling the officer corps.”[xvi]
Hugo Chavez successfully pushed through a referendum in February 2009 that abolished term limits and will allow him to run for reelection when his term is up in 2012 and as many times as he desires in the future. Despite a slumping economy—Venezuela’s Real GDP has decreased steadily recently while living costs have increased—Chavez remains decently popular with Venezuelan citizens. The slumping economy, however, is just one issue facing Venezuela; rampant poverty, decreasing regional stability, and astonishingly blatant corruption are also quite daunting. Chavez has brazenly accused opposition groups—again, backed by the U.S.—of conspiring with bankers in order to fabricate stories of corruption within Chavez’s government in order to illegitimate the current regime.
Venezuela has retained a high levels of endemic racism. In 1983, with Arab-Israeli war raging and world oil prices skyrocketing, Venezuela found itself in an opportune position; it stood to make a lot of money with its plentiful oil reserves. The whites within Venezuela were by-and-large not interested in sharing this new windfall with those members of society who had any indigenous ancestry. This widespread racism has also made opposition to Chavez quite convoluted, in that many of Chavez’s most ardent naysayers have also used bigoted rhetoric when discussing Chavez. Heiber Barreto Sanchez, for example, points out how harshly the opposition berated Chavez during the 1998 presidential election:
“Indian, monkey, and thick-lipped” have been some of the more illustrative expressions of this racist contempt that the opposition has displayed when describing Chavez. What it has forgotten is that the majority of us Venezuelans carry at least one of these features and by attempting to discredit them politically in this manner they are attacking the sentiments of a large part of the population…An unprecedented classism can be added to this visceral racism: for years the middle and upper levels of our society have been referring to people of the lower strata as “vermin and crass,” revealing through this lack of manners, taste, and customs characteristic of those who consider and project themselves as “educated, refined, and polite.”[xvii]
It will be difficult for civil society to develop in order to push for reforms unless both sides can find common areas for cooperation. Furthermore, while Chavez ran on a platform of encouraging greater civic involvement in politics, groups that control elections have emerged and many of them have very exclusionary restrictions that further their own agenda at the expense of others.
The Bolivarian Democracy of Chavez has merely glossed over problems in Venezuela. Class struggles have long been a problem in Venezuela, hence its susceptibility to Marxist influence. Chavez promised to wage ware on the elites who had a stranglehold on the country. But it is hard to dislodge the elites in any society. Chavez managed to instead decimate the fledgling middle class Venezuela. A stable middle class is indicative of a health economy, moreover, a healthy economy. Again, as both energy prices and the economy continue to fluctuate, so will Venezuelan stability.
Kazakhstan
Like many former Soviet states within Central Asia, Kazakhstan is a fledgling state with stunning advantages and disadvantages. Kazakhstan is blessed with resources, ranking eleventh in the world as of 2006 in natural gas reserves.1 Kazakhstan, however, faces challenges due to its geography, ethnic divisions, and, like other former Soviet states, the government has yet to move away from post-Soviet traditions of elitism. Kazakhstan—an independent state for less than two decades—seems to be a long ways off from tackling democratization. The state has no democratic traditions, and, what’s more, grudgingly accepted its independence in 1991.2 Although a democratic Kazakhstan may be farfetched, the young state would greatly benefit from implementing less autocratic policies and allow for a much greater degree of economic and political transparency.
A daunting challenge to reform in Kazakhstan is President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev took the helm of Kazakhstan when he was elected in 1991—he ran unopposed.2 He instituted anti-democratic policies shortly before he called for a special election in 1999 that ensured he would face no real challenge to his reelection. Nazaryabev continues to hold the office and has yet to call for another election. A few of Nazaryabev deserve recognition. Easing Kazakhstan into independence, both at home and abroad, required finesse and careful planning. In the following years, however, Nazarbayev has become more known for his inconsistencies. “The leader of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazaryabev, has not demonstrated such consistency. On the contrary, his policies have been characterized by frequent gyrations, with constant changes in basic conceptions, programs, favorites, foreign advisors, premiers, and ministers.”3
Nazarbayev sought out cooperation with Caspian states in order to lack after their interests and maintain affable and equitable relations with Russia. But Nazarbayev sought to create a Kazakh-dominated state, which has only enhanced domestic fissures and has increased tensions regionally. On one hand, this may help to nurture social movements. While under Soviet-rule, Kazakhs were markedly unhappy with Stalinist policies, as well as rigid Soviet policies as a whole. Kazakhs revolted several terms under Stalin’s rule, but to no avail. During the final years of Stalin, the Kazakhs formed the Kazakh Party. The membership boomed, increasing 155 percent between 1946 and 1953.4 The Kazakh Party, mainly communist, sought and gained seats throughout the local and state governments, and, as with Nazarbayev, a select few were even able to dialogue with Communist Party officials in Moscow. On the other hand, however, the non-Kazakh minorities, who have not enjoyed the same benefits of independent statehood as their Kazakh counterparts, are the minority. Therefore, it may be difficult to provoke reforms without the support of at least some of the Kazakh population.
The inception of NGOs is always important in the progressive of social movements and any subsequent reforms. “Kazakh society is more complex and less monolithic than that of other countries of Transoxania…The role of non-government organizations is stronger here than elsewhere, as illustrated by the Nevada-Semi-Palatinsk ecological movement created by poet Oljaz Suleimainov, who subsequently became president of the Popular Congress of Kazakhstan.”8 Different ethnic groups within Kazakhstan will need to find areas of cooperation in order to create more meaningful NGOs. One area for cooperation may be the economy. During the early years of Nazarbayev’s presidency, he seemingly had popular support for his economic policies. But despite bring inflation under control, Kazakhstan’s economic policies of been fraught with poor economic indicators; continually increasing national debt, decreasing reserve holding, and a slowing degree of foreign investment.5 If the Kazakhstan economy begins to sputter, even some of the Kazakhs may begin to grow more and more disenchanted with the elitist system.
“Regardless of where they are located, ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan feel even more economically disadvantaged and powerless because of it. Much of the fault for this, they feel, lies with the government in Kazakhstan.”6 Furthermore, 71 percent of people surveyed expressed that they felt the Soviet system was more equitable.6 Many citizens in Kazakhstan have grown increasingly disenchanted with the employment system in place in Kazakhstan. The government reacted firmly and swiftly against movements toward independent trade unions, but many such movements continue to press for employment reforms.
While the average income in Kazakhstan has increased, so has the price of food and, more disturbingly, the poverty rate.7 In fact, the overall quality of life for the majority of citizens has decreased under Nazarbayev. Urbanization has also become a challenge to Kazakhstan, both to the government and to the populace as a whole. Urbanization presents a daunting challenge to policing, and over-crowding leads to increased ethnic conflict and pollution. Nazarbayev may prefer social movements to radical Islamic movements, but the latter may grow stronger in response to ever-increasing inequalities. The Islamic fundamentalist movement in Central Asia may pose no direct threat to Kazakhstan, but the government does see it as an indirect threat. Wahhabist missionaries were arrested and jailed in 1998.9 But any overtly aggressive attempts by the government may be potentially perilous, as surrounding states or sympathetic ethnic groups may take issue with such an action. Kazakhstan, however, does remain a solidly secular state. This may explain why NGOs are more easily able to operate in Kazakhstan than they are in many Transoxanian states. As Alcott suggests, maybe Kazakhstan’s ethnic diversity has the potential to be an asset.
The disparity between the rich and the poor in Kazakhstan continues to grow. “In 1997 the government budgeted 413 million tenge to celebrate the anniversaries of Auezov and Turkestan. At the same time, it allocated only 8 millions tenge for people disabled by or who have lost a breadwinner to an ecological calamity.”10 In the years following Kazakhstan independence, industrial production shrank significantly. Seeking to rectify this, the government began to privatize industry. This was not done equitably and by the end of the decade nearly 80 percent of the entire economy was privatized. This has not only created a societal division—well at least exasperated an existing division—, it has also began to deter foreign investment. Western investors, despite the appeal of oil and gas reserves, are beginning to think twice about investing in Kazakhstan due to rapacious corruption in the highest areas of the government. Increased transparency would not only help Kazakhstanis as a whole, but it may in fact reinvigorate foreign investment.
As much as there seems to be working NGOs and stirrings of social movements, Kazakhstanis seem to be mainly political despondent. Despite overwhelming turnouts during the 1991 election—which was uncontested—political activism plummeted in just a few short years. “According to a 1997 poll, more than 40 percent of the population showed distrust of and apathy toward political parties. Such polling results reflect the popular fatigue with leaving in the highly ideological environment of a single-party society, where the executive has used the vertically integrated nationwide party structure to link the government directly to the people.”11
President Nazarbayev and his government have viewed grassroots political campaigns and other voluntary political parties as a threat to their sustained governance. It is difficult to imagine that anything but reverberating politically apathy in such a political climate. The last round of elections came under international scrutiny. “The parliamentary elections of March 1994 were criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, but the president dissolved parliament anyway.”12 Nazarbayev has also sought to centralize the government, fearing any challenges that local governments may present to his government. Moreover, Nazarbayev not only fears any challenges to him and his government, but he has sought to insulate himself from criticism. Concurrently, Nazarbayev is wary of even the prospect of democratic reforms. “In a democracy, incumbents can be turned out of office, and Communist-leaders-turned-presidents have sometimes fared poorly when facing their newly independent electorate. President Nazarbayev found this risk unacceptable and was unwilling to accept the legislative rebuffs inherent in a democratically and popularly elected parliament.”13
Nazarbayev poses a staggering obstacle for not only democratization, but, nonetheless, any reforms in Kazakhstan. Additionally, simply waiting for President Nazarbayev’s death is not going to bring about any reforms. The ruling class will simply appoint a new president to maintain the status quo. But there are common areas for cooperation in Kazakhstan. The proliferations of poverty, declining environmental conditions, sputtering economy, and the divisions within society have all been characteristics of social movements. Furthermore, if foreign investment continues to decrease and if Kazakhstan is slow to recover from the global recession, Kazakhstan’s middle class—no matter how small—will begin to empathize with the majority of citizens who are living in poverty. Which has also been a characteristic of social movements.
“Yet the seeds of the country’s future problems have already been sown. The formal collapse of the Soviet Union was brought about by a sharp series of crises, but only because the system was made vulnerable by the slow accumulation of problems unsolved or ignored during long decades of apparent stability.”14 For better or for worse, the sovereignty of Kazakhstan does seem to be in jeopardy; continued recognition of statehood by Russia, as well cooperation with China, Russia, and U.S. suggest Kazakhstan will continue to be a player on the world stage. But as Olcott implies, the continued disregard for much of the country and its problems could eventually lead to the downfall of Kazakhstan, or at least its government.
Kazakhstan should seek to revive the societal conditions around the time of its independence. “Kazakhstan had a real chance to carve for itself a separate national identity—not simply one that stressed the distinctiveness of Kazakh history and culture from that of the history and culture of other peoples in the region. Kazakhstan could have become a secular multi-ethnic democratic state with a thriving market economy. Many of the preconditions for this existed when the country received independence, including a diverse and well-developed economy, a highly skilled and educated population, and the beginnings of independent media and independent political groups.”15 It would be hard to deny that Nazarbayev was not aware of these preconditions, nor is it plausible that he and his supporters were not aware of the profits they stood to make from Kazakhstan’s oil and gas reserves.
Despite the Nazarbayev hurdle, Kazakhstan does seem more readily capable of implementing democratic reforms than many the states in the region. Kazakhstan still has NGOs and active social movements, and these will most likely continue to gain momentum in the next few years, especially if Russia continues to grow less stable from a international relations standpoint. Whenever Nazarbayev leaves office—and no matter the fashion—Kazakhstan will have a chance to begin a movement towards reform. The ruling class has shown simply a desire to stay in power and protect their interests. As such, it would behoove next would-be president to concede to some degree of reforms simply to placate the populace. And while symbolic, possibly shallow, reforms may not bring about a democratic movement, those reforms will reinvigorate Kazakhstan and lead to more political involvement.
Comparing & Contrasting
Political Climates
After twelve years of a grueling and violent battles, between 1811 and 1823, Venezuela, with the help of other nations in South America who were also fighting emancipation wars, won its independence from Spain. Like Venezuela, Kazakhstan’s independence followed the fall of a once mighty empire. The French army, led by Napoleon, invaded Spain in 1808; this was the beginning of the end for the once-mighty Spanish Empire. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not dissolve due to a military defeat,—though some still argue its embarrassing fiasco in Afghanistan brought about its downfall—instead, it was the unraveling of its perceived legitimacy and inability to maintain control of states throughout the bloc.
As previously mentioned, the Kennedy administration, as well as subsequent administrations, supported democratic movements in Venezuela. Alarmed at the attempts by guerrillas backed by Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union the U.S. not only feared proliferation of Soviet influence in the Western hemisphere, but they also felt that Venezuela was potentially a key ally in the region. But U.S. support was seemingly superficial, it did not actively encourage democratic reforms, instead, it supported those who may have paid lip service to reforms and, more importantly, were openly committed to protecting the interests of the U.S. and its western allies. This superficial support in part helped to create the current anti-U.S. sentiment within Venezuelan and helps to fuel President Hugo Chavez’s fiery, often anti-American rhetoric. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has continued its policy of promoting democracy abroad.
President George W. Bush’s tough conditions for supporting Palestinian statehood are reminiscent of the standard that his father set after the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. Each of the newly independent states was urged to embrace democratic reform as a way to secure the transition to a market economy.
Ten years later there are few success stories, and part of the blame lies with U.S. Policy makers, who have not held governments accountable for undemocratic behavior.[xviii]
President Nazarbayev, amidst criticism and pressure from both the U.S. and Europe, has continued to contend he is committed to developing democratic institutions and reforms. “However, he maintains that the Kazakhs will do this in their own time and in their own way. Kazakh-style democracy looks more like dynastic rule.”[xix]
Both Venezuela and Kazakhstan have suffered and continue to suffer from stifling levels of corruption. In its 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International rated Kazakhstan and Venezuela 120th and 162nd, respectively, out of a list 180 countries survey. The CPI shows that the populations of both countries perceive their governments as extremely corrupt and have astonishingly low levels of confidence in their governments. Recently, a long-time aide of Hugo Chavez resigned after his brother was arrested on charges related to banking scandal. Opposition leaders within Venezuela continue to accuse Chavez of being unable to crack down on the high levels of corruption amongst Venezuelan elites.
In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev’s government has admitted to having assets outside of the country. “In April 2002, Kazakhstan’s government finally admitted that the president had foreign holdings, explained as money sent abroad for safekeeping. Some believe that this disclosure was designed to minimize domestic fallout from ongoing investigations by the U.S. Justice Department of alleged wrongdoing by American firms doing business with the Kazakh government.”[xx] Nazarbayez, who is already rumored to be amongst ten-twenty richest people in the world, is believed to have already handpicked his successor—either his daughter or his son-in-law who is currently the second highest ranking official within the newly restructured national oil and gas firm—and written into the constitution provisions that will give him tremendous authority while in retirement. As for Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez successfully pushed through a referendum that allowed for a recent round of elections to be moved forward. In the subsequent election, Chavez was reelected and his term is now extended through 2012. Additionally, the new referendum did away with term-limits, allowing Chavez to run for reelection as many times as he desires. Chavez has also said he requires another ten years in order for his socialist reforms to take hold, indicating that he aspires to remain in office at least through the next decade. Additionally, Chavez keeps stating his readiness and willingness to fight the next stage in his Bolivarian revolution. Unlike Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Chavez first came to power with the stated goal of toppling the Venezuelan elites. Under Chavez, however, a new elite has emerged. A 1975 graduate of the Venezuelan Military Academy and former paratrooper, Chavez’s inner circle tends to be comprised of trusted current and former military men. So, while the situation in Kazakhstan seems more akin to a dynasty, the current political climate in Venezuela seems more like pluralism. But if Chavez leaves office voluntarily, it seems likely that he too will hand-pick his successor, or at least the next Venezuelan leader will come from within this newly created elite.
As of 2008, Freedom House International has continued to rate Venezuela as a Partly Free state that is currently in a downward trend, moving away from democracy. More disturbingly, however, Kazakhstan has consistently received a rating of Not Free in each consecutive report done by Freedom House International since it became an independent state in 1991. “The fact that significant proportions of citizens believe that their new governments are unresponsive or corrupt may be taken as a loss of faith in democracy. But it also may be interpreted quite differently—as an accurate assessment of current political realities, and as the social foundation for further efforts to achieve a full-fledged democratic order.”[xxi]
Institutions, Economics, and Civil Society
Amongst the sharpest differences in institutions between Kazakhstan and Venezuela is that of their respective militaries. The Venezuelan military has long been an influential and powerful institution within not only Venezuela, but also South America as a whole. A strong military was a necessity when Venezuela and other South American states were fighting a war of emancipation from Spanish imperial rule. Furthermore, under the Punto Fijo regime, Venezuela required a military to combat leftist guerillas that sought to destabilize states allied with the West. Chavez, however has taken the military to another level. “The broad expansion of the military’s participation in government policy making and implementation, combined with the elimination of institutions of containment and oversight, indicates that Venezuela’s institutions of civilian control have unraveled. As the events of April 11, 2002, demonstrate, elected officials no longer have the ability to defend the regime against military conspiracies or carry out their constitutional duty of ensuring that the activities of the defense bureaucracy match the policies of the civilian government. The return of Chavez to power after being deposed was a product of the political ineptness of the interim Cardona administration rather than any institutions. In the wake of this experience, Chavez did not choose to restore institutionalized control but has resorted to ever more politicized and personalized mechanisms for controlling the officer corps.”[xxii]
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, was never allowed its own military, truly independent from the Kremlin and Soviet interests. Moreover, a military buildup within Kazakhstan would be potentially calamitous, in that Central Asia—and to a larger extent, Asia as a whole—is a volatile region. As of 2002, Kazakhstan’s military employed approximately sixty-five thousand people—roughly four percent the size of active U.S. military personnel. “While Kazakhstan’s military gets some training from NATO nations, most of its equipment still comes from Russia, partly paid for in cash and partly in exchange for debt forgiveness.”[xxiii] Kazakhstan relies heavily on Russia, as it did with the Soviet Union, both economically and militarily. “Russia’s military superiority, coupled with its ability to cripple Kazakhstan’s economy, explains why Nazarbayev worked harder than anyone else to keep the USSR alive. He then worked hard to make a reality the various postcollapse bodies such as the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), common ruble spaces, the Euro-Asian Union, and the five-nation customs union. The Kazakhs have been strong advocates of Putin’s effort to redefine the customs union as a Eurasian economic community. This stance is unlikely to change should there be a transfer of power in Kazakhstan.”[xxiv]
While the Venezuelan government under Hugo Chavez has and continues to seek out both economic and military alliances, Chavez seems less willing to be a free-rider than Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev. Hugo Chavez, however, must contend with an extraordinarily influential and powerful military that has already shown the ability to depose his regime. Although Chavez is a military man, perhaps he views a strong military as an institutional imperative, allowing his regime to remain in power.
Both Kazakhstan and Venezuela rely heavily on oil and gas production to fuel their economies. As of 2006, Kazakhstan and Venezuela ranked eleventh and ninth, respectively, in natural gas reserves, accounting for approximately two-percent of all the world’s natural gas reserves. While these two resource rich states have employed different economic policies, both have policies that have ultimately benefited the elites. For decades Venezuelan elites had enjoyed the fruits of foreign investment from the U.S. Under Chavez, however, the oil nationalized and used to fund “social programs.” But as rampant poverty continues to proliferate the Venezuelan population and, what’s more, Chavez continues to increase military expenditures, it’s hard to fathom that many of the profits from the state-run oil industry are serving their explicitly intended purpose. In contrast, Kazakhstan, as it has with much of its industry, has privatized oil and gas firms. Paradoxically, however, the privatization has resulted in the greatest economic benefit of Nazarbayev and his inner circle. Both Chavez and Nazarbayev have adopted economic policies that have nationalized/privatized oil and gas firms and, moreover, both have policies that benefit few within their respective societies. While Chavez has adopted a façade, albeit through apathy or arrogance, his economic policies are not addressing the economic disparities, which he claimed he would address. In comparison, Nazarbayev has never made sought refuge behind such a façade. His regime has reorganized oil and gas firms in a way that maximizes their profit potential, indiscriminately seeking out foreign investment. They have made no qualms as to who is benefiting from foreign investment, brazenly throwing themselves lavish celebrations as the majority of Kazakhs fall into poverty.
Perhaps the most similar characteristic, surprisingly, of both Kazakhstan and Venezuela is civil society and ethnic/racial tension. Both Chavez and Nazarbayev claim to champion their respective ethnic groups; Chavez, as aforementioned, has some degree of indigenous ancestry, while Nazarbayev continues to champion the attributes of the Kazakh majority. In Venezuela, the whites ruled for nearly a century. Under Chavez, a new racial resentment has taken over; the whites are now distrusted. Kazakhstan, however, has a long history of Kazakh oppression at the hands of the Soviets. Currently, Nazarbayev has tacitly asserted Kazakh dominance, but Nazarbayev is forced to maintain a delicate balance between the Kazakhs and the many estranged ethnically Russians, as Nazarbayev seemingly views appeasing the Russians as an imperative to Kazakh stability. “Kazakhstan’s independence was born in Moscow and is likely to last precisely as long as Russia wishes it.”[xxv]
Both Kazakhstan and Venezuela have, in the past, enjoyed civil society. Recently, however, their civil societies have devolved. This may be the greatest imperative to a rebirth of a democratic society in both states.
[i] “Comparative Democracy & Democratization” by Howard J. Wiarda, Wadsworth Group, Belmont, CA; 2004.
[ii] “The Logic of Bolivarian Democracy in Venezuela: Domestic and International Connections” by Daniel H. Levin, University of Michigan, August 2008.
[iii] The Military and Democracy” by Louis Wolf Goodman, Johanna Mendelson Forman, Juan Rial Roade
[iv] Steve Ellner. Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chavez Phenomenon. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2008). 18.
[v] David J. Myers. “The Normalization of Punto Fijo Democracy.” in Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. ed. Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 17.
[vi] Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, “Introduction: New Perspectives and the Chavez Phenomenon.” in Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”. ed. Steven Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). xviii.
[vii] “The Failure of Political Reform In Venezuela” by Julia Buxton, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, Vermont; 2001.
[viii] Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, “Introduction: New Perspectives and the Chavez Phenomenon.” in Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”. ed. Steven Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 5.
[ix] Steve Ellner. Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chavez Phenomenon. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2008). 142.
[x] Miguel Tinker Salas, “U.S. Oil Companies in Venezuela: The Forging of an Enduring Alliance.” in Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”. ed. Steven Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 46.
[xi] Dick Parker, “Chavez and the Search for an Alternative to Neoliberalism.” in Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”. ed. Steven Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 65.
[xii] Julia Buxton. The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001). 25.
[xiii] Damarys Canache. “Urban Poor and Political Order.” in Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. ed. Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 40.
[xiv] Christopher I. Clement, “Confronting Hugo Chavez: U.S. ‘Democracy Promotion’ in Latin America.” in Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”. ed. Steven Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 185.
[xv] “Julia Buxton. The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001). 76.
[xvi] Harold A. Trinkunas. “The Military: From Marginalization to Center Stage.” in Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. ed. Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 68-69.
[xvii] Heiber Barreto Sanchez. 2002 “Lo que se le olvida a la oposicion politica: raza y clase en la V republica.” America Latina en Movimiento. December 16. alienet.org/active/show_text.php3?key+2945.
1 Michael T. Klare. Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2008). 47.
2 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 24.
3 Boris Rumer. “Economic Crisis and Growing Intraregional Tensions.” in Central Asia and the New Global Economy ed. Boris Rumer (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). 36.
4 Martha Brill Olcott. The Kazakhs (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1995). 221.
8 Oliver Roy. The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations (New York, N.Y.: I. B. Tauris, 2009). 135.
5 Emine Gurgen, Harry Snoek, Jon Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski, and Ron van Rooden. Economic Reforms In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999). 50.
6 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 197.
7 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 201.
9 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 210.
10 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 206.
11 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 94.
12 Oliver Roy. The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations (New York, N.Y.: I. B. Tauris, 2009). 134.
13 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 87.
14 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 215.
15 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 220.
[xviii] Martha Brill Olcott. “Kazakhstan ‘Democracy’ is Spelled ‘Dynasty’.” Newsday, n.d., http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1025 (20 November 2009).
[xix] Martha Brill Olcott. “Kazakhstan ‘Democracy’ is Spelled ‘Dynasty’.” Newsday, n.d., http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1025 (20 November 2009).
[xx] Reuters. “Chavez aid resigns over banking scandal.” Business Day: News Worth Knowing, n.d., < id="88919"> (6 December 2009)
[xxi] Bruce Parrott. “Perspectives on postcommunist democratization.” in Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 27.
[xxii] Harold A. Trinkunas. “The Military: From Marginalization to Center Stage.” in Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. ed. Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 68-69.
[xxiii] Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 233.
[xxiv] Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 233.
[xxv] Martha Brill Olcott. The Kazakhs. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). 292.
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