Thursday, March 11, 2010

Excerpt from "Introduction", from Ask Why: Questioning the way forward in Afghanistan by Noel Paul McAuliffe

Afghanistan has been continuously—and unfortunately—touted as the front line in The War on Terror. Speaking at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, on December 1st, 2009, President Obama stated unequivocally that American military efforts were justified and necessary. “We did not ask for this fight,” he said, “On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder 3,000 people. They struck our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.” Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda cowardly used these 3,000 civilians to attack U.S. foreign policy—not freedom as President Bush so callously asserted. President Obama stated that the senate, 98-0, in 2001, unanimously approved the military actions against Afghanistan but that the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated in part because military efforts had been more focused on another U.S.-led invasion of an Islamic state—Iraq.

He acknowledged that the overarching goal of the 2001 invasion had not been accomplished. “Al-Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population.” Obama himself has shown a reassuring proclivity towards counterinsurgency. The previous administration had for years refused to even entertain the notion that an insurgency existed in Iraq. Obama’s speech was intended to outline the way forward in Afghanistan: what American interests are at stake in the region, and what the stakes are to the American people, and what his administration will use to accomplish its objectives.

Missing from this speech, however, was what strategies will be employed to achieve success. Though they are vastly different, strategy and tactics tend be considered one-in-the-same by laypersons. I posted such a question regarding whether or not there was a cogent strategy behind the “surge” of forces in Afghanistan. Internet users of the Greeley Tribune immediately met my question with contempt and rancorous derision. In a sense, that ridicule is symbolic of my critique of not only Obama’s speech, but also, also, the current disposition amongst the American public towards the military adventure in Afghanistan.

There are colossal and critical questions that are not being asked by large portions of American policy makers and citizens. First, why is America in Afghanistan? Second, what defines success and/or progress in Afghanistan? Third, how will the American public define success and/or progress in Afghanistan? It is imperative that these—and probably other—questions by asked by not only policy makers but also, more importantly, the American public at-large.

Far too often a large percentage of the American public assumes that it has no place in the discussion of its nation’s foreign policy. Further, American policy makers tend to bear the brunt of the criticism for foreign policy blunders. Foreign policy has never been and should never solely be the responsibility of policy makers. Moreover, whenever the use of military force is a part of a specific foreign policy, the American public must make a more concerted effort to remain cognizant of such policies.

Saturday, March 6, 2010

Another Great Quote

"Perhaps there is no great point in recalling all the tragic and idiotic blunders, all the false optimism, all the unrealism of the first phases of the war, but it is not possible to appreciate fully the heroism of the Security Forces unless the stupidities of some of those in command are remembered."--from "The End of the War," Straits Times (20 April 1960), in Templer Papers.