I was working late on the evening of May 2nd, 2011 when I felt my phone vibrate seemingly on end. Without even pulling my phone out of my pocket I was able to ascertain as to what the excitement was. In passing, a man gave me nod and said, “I just heard on the radio that we killed bin Laden. He was hit with a missile or something.” Obviously, it was the “or something” statement that was correct, as every news agency and cable network—including ESPN—announced that a team of U.S. military special operations personnel, led by the legendary SEAL Team 6, had shot and killed Osama bin Laden after a brief fire fight at bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan.
My immediate response was one of skepticism—maybe the man had misunderstood some other report. But after seeing the deluge of texts from friends and family, and the plethora of tweets, I felt there was a high likelihood this event—nearly two decades in the making--had finally come to fruition. After getting a free moment to check the reports on the Internet, my reaction was initially one of relief. Unlike, many of my fellow Americans shown on television news reports, I was not overcome with ebullient nationalism and nascent unity—however fleeting it may have been. Osama bin Laden was still the face of global terror, as well as it’s galvanizing voice, and his death does make the world a safer place. But bin Laden had failed in his war against United States. Bin Laden’s cowardly and terrible attack on American civilians had yielded his desired results: a conflict between the American military and his “holy warriors.” Bin Laden was embarrassed when his adversary was able push back his own forces, as well as those of his Taliban host’s, using a relatively small military contingent—Special Operations, CIA specialists, and coordinated air and missile strikes. Like most many Americans, however, my mind immediately went to wondering how this would affect American foreign and military policy in Afghanistan and, moreover, Pakistan.
Pakistan Asks for More Cooperation from the CIA
In early April 2011 Pakistani officials asked their American counterparts within the diplomatic and intelligence agencies to be share more of the intelligence they had gathered on terrorist entities operating within it’s borders—and, likely, Afghanistan, as well. Furthermore, they asked the CIA to drastically reduce missile strikes made by Predator Drones within Pakistan. Pakistani leaders had been frustrating the Obama administration as well as the US military as they fierily denounced the attacks as not only an attack on Pakistani sovereignty, but they also claimed the attacks exacted massive collator damage—claims that were generally unfounded. However, when confronted by officials like the late Richard Holbrooke and General David Patreaus, who continually asked Pakistani leaders to not publicly criticize the drone attacks, the Pakistani’s would attempt to elucidate their agreement that the drone attacks were helpful and their criticisms were necessary in order to remain politically viable.
At the time such requests seemed utterly laughable. While Pakistan is hardly the greatest benefactor when it comes to US foreign aid contributions—receiving an estimated $3 billion annually, of which nearly half is intended to be used for humanitarian purposes, the rogue state has been given a great deal of leeway.
Firstly, Pakistan possesses WMD and, at best, has failed to notice that the man who helped most in the development of their nuclear weapons program, nuclear scientist and metallurgical engineer, A.Q. Khan, was willing to sell his expertise to other rogue states such as North Korea and Libya. Secondly, Pakistan’s government is considered one of the most corrupt in the world, ranked the 143rd most corrupt government by Transparency International, between such luminaries as Zimbabwe and Iran. Pakistan’s government operates, essentially, at the behest of the military. Furthermore, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), not only views the Taliban as a strategic asset but, moreover, has been implicated in harboring and training terrorists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which allegedly carried out terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India in 2008 that killed over 300 people. Many reports have surfaced that suggest that, at the least, the LeT terrorists who took part in the attacks had ISI handlers.
When US officials expressed that they were mulling over Pakistan’s request to reduce the CIA’s role and share more intelligence in Pakistan, it should have seemingly offended the sensibilities of even the most dovish of foreign policy wonks. As Tom Paulson wrote on Humanosphere, most of what the US gives to Pakistan is “mostly for political reasons,” and, especially now, it needs to be put under intense criticism. What’s more, as previously mentioned, Pakistan has shown itself time and time again to be a rogue, repressive state that is not interested confronting Islamic extremism.
Immediately following the announcement that the symbol of global terror had been brought to justice, it was reported that, what was widely suspected was true, Osama bin Laden had been residing. But, disturbingly, he had not been hiding in cave in along the frontier provinces near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a long-time safe haven for both Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives. Rather, the man responsible for perpetrating the worst attack against America since Pearl Harbor—it should be noted, continuously, that bin Laden attacked civilians and not uniformed military—was living comfortably in the posh neighborhood of Abbottabad; a neighborhood comprised almost entirely of current and retired senior Pakistani military officers. Not to mention, his compound was nearly a mere half of a mile away from Pakistan’s premier military academy, Pakistan Military Academy.
Bad Men Behaving Badly
For years Pakistan’s foundering political leadership has been telling the world that despite the widespread reports that Osama bin Laden was alive and well, living somewhere in Pakistan, that they did not know where bin Laden was or that he was not in Pakistan altogether. Northwestern Pakistan has been a point of contention between US-led coalition leaders and Pakistani officials. Taliban leadership has been based in northwest Pakistan, mainly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), ever since being expelled from Kabul and Kandahar in November of 2001. Furthermore, most of the Taliban insurgents seemed to be flowing back and forth from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Former President Pervez Musharraf, the man who had negotiated the windfall diplomatic agreement with the Bush Administration, had originally promised to patrol the FATA and attack Taliban outposts. But after years of inaction and rhetoric, Bush ordered an escalation of the CIA presence there, mainly using unmanned aerial vehicles armed with missiles that would strike insurgent camps with relative precision. Pakistani officials continually decried these attacks and asserted that they had the situation under control.
Comedian Jon Stewart humorously berated and chided Pakistani leaders who had continuously lauded that they had no idea where bin Laden was. But Stewart most vehemently attacked Musharraf’s assertion that, after bin Laden’s death, it would have been an exercise in incompetence for intelligence and military officials to place bin Laden in such an auspicious area. Which, therefore, left their defense to, at best, indifference or, at the worst, incompetence. But neither defense is laudable. Pakistan is now not only complacent in harboring Taliban insurgents and leadership, but, what’s more, their complacency has extended to America’s public enemy number one.
Since late 2001 Pakistan has received extremely favorable treatment from the US after agreeing to become an ally in the War on Terror. As the Obama administration was developing its strategy towards Afghanistan, experts continually informed the administration Pakistan is the greatest challenge to American success in Afghanistan. AfPak was the term coined for the theater of conflict. Pakistani officials immediately took issue with the term; they did not enjoy the implication that they were a part of the problem.
While it is widely believed that Al Qaeda operatives, acting on order from bin Laden, assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9th, 2001, it is likely that Taliban played some role as well. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders likely welcomed Massoud’s death. Ahmed Shah Massoud, a heroic Mujahideen leader, was brilliant leader and military tactician who commanded the Northern Alliance—a collection of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other ethnicities within Afghanistan who opposed the Pashtun Taliban and their control of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance was funded, primarily, by Russia, India, and Iran. The Pakistani military likely viewed the Northern Alliance as a rogue threat from its Indian adversaries. The Taliban continue to be the counterweight to what Pakistan perceives as an attempt by India spread regional influence and subversion.
What’s less clear, however, is what kind of strategic relationship existed between Pakistan and Osama bin Laden. Was bin Laden simply being warehoused and protected by the ISI and Pakistani military? Bin Laden has had a long relationship with the reputed leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, which began when both men were fighting to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Many of the Afghan Mujahideen were distrustful of influx of foreign fighters, in particular, the Arabs who treated them as lower life forms, but Omar protected and trusted bin Laden. Was this relationship with the Taliban leader what motivated Pakistani officials to allow bin Laden to live just out of the reach of his American pursuers? Or does Pakistan view Al Qaeda and its leadership as a strategic asset as well?
The way forward in regards to AfPak has always been murky, but this latest betrayal by America’s supposed ally just makes the outcome likely even more abysmal. American diplomats know they can dialogue with Pakistani political leaders until they are blue in the face and in return get a myriad of tired excuses and feigned remorse. But they know nothing they say is likely to change. Pakistan is governed in the shadows by the military. Ratcheting up diplomatic pressure has already been done, that was Richard Holbrooke’s trademark. The military has fought marvelously in Afghanistan, but counterinsurgency is a terrible form of warfare. Furthermore, a successful counterinsurgency is generally 10% military and 90% political. The Obama administration has attempted to address the extremely decentralized governance by trying to build civil society at the tribal level, while still attempting to foster democratization at a federal level. Afghanistan’s political leaders are generally corrupt and have no interest in democracy and tribal elders fear retribution from the Taliban if they appear to help coalition forces. Politically, Obama doesn’t want to give up on what he himself called zenith of the War on Terror. Concurrently, it seems the only viable option left to put pressure on Pakistan is to pull their largesse, which, nonetheless, would not be a popular move for Obama, politically. With the recent events in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, Obama has drawn criticism for failing to protect civilians from the repressive regimes they are demonstrating against; Pakistan’s regime is one of extreme repression and corruption—and one that condones and harbors terrorists.
In “Descent Into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia” Ahmed Rashid writes that the West has failed to address the problems in Central Asia and that has led to what has come be in the region. Rashid reveals an optimism that emerged after 9/11 in the minds of democratic-minded Muslims throughout the world that America and the West would address disaster that Central Asia had become under autocratic rules and repressive regimes. There was thought that America and West would commit resources to help lift the region from the chaos. But, Rashid argues, that the failure to engage in meaningful nation building just exacerbated the existing chaos and has led to the current situation. However, nation building can easily be viewed as a military occupation, and, what’s more, both can equally dismal. Further, nation building will not produce the desired results with Pakistan.
Osama bin Laden’s death is a good thing. It is a semblance of justice for the victims of his misguided jihad. But the fact that he was killed in Pakistan is a step back in the War on Terror.
