As the United States and its coalition partners ramp up military actions in Libya, many Americans have responded, understandably, with consternation. Further, coalition partners, like the United Kingdom, face similar domestic economic issues and do not understand see the value in interceding in the Libyan crisis. The average cruise missile launched at Gadhafi’s military machine costs one million dollars. Why are these expensive actions necessary? Why did Obama seek out United Nations and Arab League approval before that of the US legislature? What is the end-game?While the punditry—on both sides--failed to reasonably examine and question presidential decisions in the military endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have been more than willing to latch on to the situation in Libya. Judith Miller, former New York Times columnist and current columnist for Newsmax—a moderately-conservative publication, posed, basically, the same questions I have—the same questions she didn’t seem to think needed answering in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, or the same ones, in regards to Obama’s strategy towards Afghanistan, that got my Op-Ed pulled from the Greeley Tribune. Questioning the strategy—moreover, asking for it—in Afghanistan was largely unpopular and uninteresting to many Americans. Concurrently, Obama’s changes to the overarching strategy in Afghanistan failed to draw much political interest from the opposition and the punditry. The situation in Libya is seemingly more appealing to the punditry; Obama is beleaguered, politically, and the republicans desire his constant capitulation. As my dad so poignantly stated today, “They want him to check with daddy.”
Judith Miller wondered why Obama was not as willing to intercede in other Arab/Muslim states that are uprising against their dictators. While she did directly advise that Obama not adopt a uniform policy/strategy for dealing uprisings in the Middle East, she did hint at a grandiose strategy for the region. She suggested supporting the toppling of each respective regime. But, in doing so, Ms. Miller failed to recognize that the current instability is, somewhat, a negative reflection on US foreign policy; the US has supported regimes simply because of their benevolence towards Israel. The United States needs to support popular movements against dictators, no matter where they may be or what the perceived consequences may be, all over the world.
Obama is drawing much criticism—much of it is fair, but much of it’s imbecilic—over his administration’s foreign policy. Many have expressed trepidation over what they view as weak, self-effacing foreign policy aimed repairing America’s reputation amongst the global community, a reputation that atrophied during the Bush administration. George W. Bush’s foreign policy failures—ill advised and poorly managed military endeavors, reticence to condemn Israeli military action in 2006—resulted in the squandering of what may have been the pinnacle of America’s power within the international political economy.
Many Americans, pundits, politicians, and voters, alike, have suggested that Obama’s overtly diplomatic approach to foreign policy will weaken America’s power on the global stage. Many of these suggestions are, at best, somewhat misguided, or, worse, farcical. Foreign policy is difficult to understand. Most pundits rarely engage in discussing foreign policy, and, what’s more, if they do so, they’re discourse is usually superficial and self-serving. Foreign policy wonks tend to be academics and intellectuals, and, therefore, most Americans may find it difficult to stay meaningfully informed regarding international affairs. There is no intent, on my part, to be condescending. How many people do you know who regularly pore over issues of Foreign Policy Magazine or The Journal of Foreign Affairs? Having tutored students in the past, I can tell you that introduction level courses in international relations or foreign policy deter many undergraduates from those very subjects. Unfortunately, however, the current tone of the GOP and many conservative pundits is one of anti-intellectualism.
Many influential and prolific foreign policy wonks have been conservatives. Colin Powell had the transcendent ability to engage aptly in diplomacy and still engage the American public in rhetoric that made foreign policy more readily digestible for the average American. But, like other scholars and seasoned diplomats, Powell, as Secretary of State, was forced to take a backseat to seasoned political infighters and overly hawkish individuals within the administration. Bush had already made up his mind on invading Iraq and he was seemingly only interested in information from his administration that made the case for war. While George H.W. Bush had instructed his Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, with building the largest coalition he could—this would prove a logistical nightmare for military planners, George W. Bush was not interested in building a tangible coalition. Moreover, George H.W. Bush charged his staff at the State Department to gain UN approval, while George W. Bush thumbed has nose at the UN after they failed to return a favorable vote on the actions he wished to pursue.
The criticisms that Obama is being too diplomatic and that his administration’s approach to foreign policy will weaken America’s stature are eerily similar to George W. Bush declaring that John Kerry would make America less safe. Unbridled unilateralism—cowboy foreign policy—does fetch increased national security or a greater influence within the international political economy. For example, while many regard Reagan as a foreign policy hawk who imposed his will on other states, his dovish qualities that allowed him to engage in discourse and negotiations with the Soviet Union that yielded foreign policy and national security gains. On the other hand, when Reagan dubiously asserted that he would turn Latin America into a “beacon of freedom,”, it represented the derisory and ill-fated hawkish stances that, nearly three-decades later, still pervade American foreign policy. Propping up regimes simply because they postulate Western sympathies, and, currently—especially amongst Arab states, assert benevolent positions towards Israel.
Once again, Judith Miller delivers sterling points when discussing the situations in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. But, ironically, she indicts Obama for playing politics, while admitting that the challenges in dealing with those other states would be logistically and politically stupefying. Bashar al-Assad has shown the requisite benevolence towards Israel, and, therefore, disrupting his government would be politically perilous for Mr. Obama—the US-Israel lobby is one of the most powerful in Washington. Any intervention—political or otherwise—in Yemen would be nearly as challenging as the AfPak situation. Bahrain, a tiny state that has enjoyed largesse of oil wealth, is a state with over a million citizens that are ruled by a constitutional monarchy. As Ms. Miller recognizes, American intervention in all of theses states would leave an enormous footprint in the region, and, therefore, specifically tailored responses to each situation is an imperative.
Consulting, as well as seeking the approval of, the Arab League, from a foreign policy standpoint, seems to make sense. The Arab League, like any regional alliance, has economic and political goals, but they can also provide insight into regional values and, to an extent, valuable intelligence. The US should take advantage of the different diplomatic apparatuses—America still has the clout to do whatever it wants. And, ultimately, it’s unilateralism that weakens American power, not diplomacy.
No matter what Glenn Beck claims to have “read,” it is laughable—or worse—to think that he can provide any meaningful insight into the situation in the Middle East. Most states have a vast network of diplomats and statesmen across the globe who have spent years in their respective theaters getting to know the populations. The US State Department is no exception. Every presidential administration has an immense array of talented diplomats and statesmen at their disposal. Also, the American president has to know that they have the power to act unilaterally, if so desired.
As is the mission of this blog, the desired position is somewhere in the middle; American foreign policy is best conducted when policy makers are willing to engage in diplomacy, but still willing to represent American interests when diplomacy fails. That being said, however, when receiving criticism from your peers, policy makers should never ignore diplomatic criticisms; rather, policy should evaluate criticisms as advice. Anyone who thinks they fully understand themselves is a fool, and, correspondingly, anyone who believes they know more about another is an imbecile. The truth is always somewhere in the middle.
